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lie following section should be included after the section
988:191)"
L'I think this is a pity... (Hart
What then is it that we would want to learn about trust? Considering the fact that
lis volume has as its subject "trust and co-operation" I think we would like to know,
irstly, what trust means for co-operation and vice versa. Secondly, in what forms trust
lay arise in society and what may be the conséquences for co-operation. Thirdly, how
ventually trust may be enhanced.
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Interest in issues of trust has increased throughout the past few yeais, but publications
tend to remain rather abstract and theoretical. Some of them, such as Fukuyama (1995)
and Misztal (1996) have trust as their major subject. Others, such as Eister (1989) and
Giddens (1995), treat trust as a major component of broader issues. Until now, however,
few case studies haveexisted in which the concept of trust has been used as an analytical
tooi for explaining social phenomena. The volume of essays edited by Gambetta (19983)
'Trust: making and breaking coopérative relations' is one of the few. Moreover, recent
studies on trust mainly focus on the (post-) industrial world. The latter is no surprise con-
sidering the fact that the urge to reconsider the notion of trust in the first place emerged
among economists and western sociologists. They observed that the modern world, de-
spite the globalisation tendencies of capitalist developrnent, did not automatically de-
velop more openness and co-operation between the people thus connected. Instead, it
was found that processes of localisation frequently led to social retreat and economie
stagnation. In this light, it was all the more interesting that some societies in south-east
Asia did appear to be able to successfully couple aspects of globalisation with their local
cultures, ultimately leading to economie 'success' stories. Trust was welcomed as a con-
cept that eventually could shed a light on all of these phenomena.
Africa, however, hardly émerges as a field of study among the aforementioned schol-
ars of trust. Is this perhaps because the continent is considered less interesting, having no
impressive examples of the south east Asian kind? Or is it because, from a Durkheimian
perspective, one tends to think that Africa is still reigned by tradition, where trust is of no
significance? For their part, most modern Africanist research leaves aside the issue of
trust, despite its implicit présence in many discussions like those on the relationship be-
tween farmers and the state. See, for example, Hyden's (1980; 1983) concept of the 'un-
captured peasantry', which suggests that African peasants can always retreat from the
state due to their subsistence base (for criticism of this concept see Cliffe 1987; Geschiere
1984; Kasfir 1986). Hyden (1983:17) describes the 'economy of affection' as the peasant
mode of production in which the affective ties based on common descent, common rési-
dence et cetera prevail. The economy of affection may promote trust at the local level,
but it hinders developrnent on a larger scale. The relationship between state and peas-
antry is, however, not further elaborated from this trust-perspective. More recently,
trust was also discussed for civil society. For example 'lapolitique du ventre'[politics of
thé belly] and ' l'état rhizome '[rhizome state] as developed by Bayart (1989), point to m-
terlaced networks of factions in society, who try to get hold of power and goods. It has
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been demonstrated how people try to invest cheir solidarity as profitably as possible, but
whereas trust necessarily plays a rôle in people's décisions to invest, this issue is not
elab-orated upon'. The volume Governance andPolitics in Africa, edited by Hyden and
Bratton (1992) is an exception. In the introductory chapter, Hyden outlines a genera!
model for governance, in which trust is presented as one of the key-elements, that is, as
one of the prerequisites for effective governance, the others being audiority, reciprocity,
and accountability. It is said that when consensus about the validity of basic norms can
no longer be taken for granted, trust is insufficient to sustain effective social action, and,
as a conséquence, accountability becomes particularly important (1992:11). This is an in-
teresting point of view, but when it cornes to application in the African context that the
theory appears to offer, the promise does not matérialise. In the chapters following the
introduction to this aforementioned volume, which contain case studies from different
African countries, none of the contributors ever mentions 'trust' again.
I think this is a pity. In my view, research on Africa may benefit from the introduction
of the notion of trust in the analysis ofconcrete situations, and I think that discussions on
trust may be enriched by material from Africa. Giddens (1995), for example, in his con-
vincing style sketched the différences herween modern society and pre-modern ones and
the rôle of trust in them. The resourcefulness of his analysis, however, would not be done
justice if we restricted ourselves to treading in his footsteps by only contrasting these
pôles. Exactly those situations where the modern and the pre-modern meet and inter-
twine offer potentially interesting opportunities for gaining additional information
abouttheworkingandimportanceoftrust. Hart (1988), asoneofthevery few Africanists
taking trust as a core concept, in his study of migrants in Accra, Ghana, already provided
a beautiful example. He concludes that 'trust is central to social life when neither tradi-
tional certainties nor modern probabilities hold.' (Hart 1988:191). 41 *
Although it is generally assumed that trust and co-operation are linked, there is no
agreement as to what that linkage exactly looks like. Good (1988) went no further than to
state that co-operation is a central manifestation of trust. Axelrod (1984) focuses on trust
as resulting from co-operation. Most scholars, however, consider trust as a precondition
for co-operation. Without trust, Luhmann argues, only very simple forms of human
co-operation, which can be transacted on the spot are possible (1979:88). In more com-
plex situations, people have to cope with events not directly visible, with factors not yet
present, and withother people whocannotbefathomedentirely;outsideinfluences may
change one's position, future events may alter one's chances and possible free riders are
always around. For all that, one needs trust in order to effectively engage in collective ac-
tion. Gambetta (i988a; I988b) is a strong advocate of this view of trust as a precondition
for co-operation. Eister (1989) holds a slightly different view in that hè emphasises that
trust can best be seen as a social lubricant, which can facilitate co-operation. It has to be
stressed, however, that in reviewing the different positions of authors, confusion often
arises because it is not made clear whether trust is considered a driving force fostering
co-operation, or merely a by-product of other more important motivations such as
self-interest or adhérence to norms. Undoubtedly, this lack of clarity is related to thé fact
that trust in itself is not visible, which makes it difficult to pinpoint.
Precisely because trust is such an clusive concept, it would perhaps help to distin-
guish between différent types or forms of trust and to investigate how thèse are related to
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co-operacion. The problem of différent types of trust and their rôle and signifîcance in
society is especially elaborated in connection with modernity. Luhrnann works out a dis-
tinction between trust and confidence: confidence exists where there is no possibility of
choice, while trust présupposes choice and as a conséquence thé active décision to en-
gage. He states that when thé prédominant type of social differentiation shifts from strat-
ification to functional differentiation, people are no longer placed in a fixed social set-
ring. When structures become contingent, '[tjrust remains vital in interpersonal
relations, but participation in functional Systems like thé economy or politics is no lon-
ger a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, but not trust' (Luhmann
1988:102).
Giddens touches thé same issue, but his emphasis is somewhat différent, in that he
deals with trust as part of an analysis of socio-structural changes related to modernity. In
pre-modern cultures, according to Giddens, there is an overriding importance of local-
ised trust, while in modem cultures trust relations vested in disembedded abstract Sys-
tems become most important (1995:102). Abstract Systems can be divided in symbolic to-
kens and expert Systems. Thèse are both disembedding mechanisms, in that they provide
for thé 'lifting out of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restruc-
turingacrossindefinitespansoftime-space' (1995:21) Ail disembedding mechanisms dé-
pend upon trust, whereby trust is vested, not in individuals, but in abstract capacities. It
is a mistake, however, to think that in thé modem world large impersonal Systems in-
creasingly colonise personal life, because thé disembedding mechanisms not only lift so-
cial relations and thé exchange of information out of spécifie time-space contexts, but at
the same time provide new opportunities for their re-embedding (Giddens
1995:141-142).
Finally, given that thé issue of trust as an object of study came arose because problems
of social cohésion and co-operation were observed. It is noteworthy that no scholar of
trust has actually developed an approach for thé solution of thèse problems. The charac-
ter and essence of trust are being studied, as are thé conditions of its coming into being,
and in this, of course, starting-points for solutions can be found. For example Luhmann
(1979) stresses thé importance of possibilities of sanction for thé évolution and mainte-
nance of trust. Others stress thé importance of communication and information
(Gambetta igSSb; Vickers 1987). Practically no author, however, continues his or her
line of thought by elaborating ways of how trust could be enhanced in order to facilitate
co-operation. In thé end, Elster (1989) décides that although trust is a condition for
co-operation, it is too risky to rely on, and thus it is more useful to immediately focus on
co-operation, setting the issue of trust aside. Gambetta (igSSa) in reviewing thé contri-
butions of thé other authors of his collection concludes that trust is worthwhile to work
on, but he eventually falls to explain how this may be done.
Given that, on the one hand, case studies on trust are scarce and trust has not been an
issue in most African studies, it seems worthwhile to try to contribute to thé discussion
on trust and co-operation by investigating a concrète situation in Africa. In this chapter,
I will describe a small rural Community in Senegal and shall use thé concept of trust to
analyse local reactions to thé arrivai of a development project. In thé first section, I will
argue that traditionally trust was not only self-évident between relatives, it also was con-
sidered morally right. Récent developments, however, deeply changed local society, un-
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dermining traditional hiérarchies and old certainties; from a kinship-based, relatively
closed social System, it developed into a moi e diffuse clientelistic System. The second sec-
tion will describe howpeople responded to thé arrivai of a development project. It will be
demonstrated that this was in a rather ambiguous way, stating trust in words and behav-
iour publicly, while showing feelings of deep mistrust in private. In trying to find an an-
swer for this puzzling phenomenon, thé thirdsection will return to the description of the
social System and its development over time to illustrate its conséquences for thé work-
ing of trust. The insights gathered will be applied to thé case study in thé fourth section.
Finally, a more général conclusion will be drawn.
The rural Community of Keur Ousmane': old values and new stratégies in
a changing environment
Keur Ousmane is situated in the central région of Senegal, just north of the Gambian
border. The rural Community covers a surface of 195 km1, consists of 23 villages and has a
population of 10,311 (Secki995). While Senegal as a whole is home to as many as 19 ethnie
groups (Hesseling & Kraemer 1996), the Community of Keur Ousmane is rather homo-
geneous: most of the people are Wolof (90%), and the remaining people are mainly
Toucouleur. Practically eveiybody is Muslim.
Traditionally, the social order is based on bonds of kinship. In addition to this hori-
zontal organisation, Wolof society is strongly hierarchically structured. A distinction
can be made between the caste of the geer, the nobles, and the caste of the nieenio, to
which the artisans and the minstrels belong. Both castes are still divided in diambour,
freeborn, and diam, descendants from slaves. In this System, patron-client relationships
were institutionalised in the relationships and codes of behaviour between the different
castes. Thus, thejïwwere expected to give présents to their lower in rank; nieeno'm their
turn would praise the geerand would render various services at ceremonies of baptism,
marnage and the like. While formally the relations between the different social catégo-
ries were very unequal, several mechanisms existed to balance the relationships. The rule
of generosity was one of them, and the rule that a noble should not live from the work of a
lower in rank. Thus, the possession ofslaves did not free the noble from the obligation to
work; the slave only assisted him and for this he also received all kinds of gratification
(Sylla 1994). The concept of honour was of central importance to the functioning of
these mechanisms. This can best be illustrated by elaborating a characterisation of the
man of honour.
Properly speaking, only ageercould be a man of honour; but because the category of
the geerformed a frame of référence for other groups, the value of honour affects the
whole of society. The man of honour in Wolof society wants to réalise the moral and so-
cial ideal of the group hè belongs to (Ly 1967). He is always conscious of the fact that hè is
a member of a family and, as a conséquence of his birth, also of a social group, and hè is
conscious of the rôle he has to play for maintaining and continuing the respectability in
which hè, by conséquence, participâtes. For checking his behaviour, his nawle, his social
equals, are the benchmarks. One who is not of 'better birth', is supposed not to 'be
better', and thus also not to 'do more'. Consequently, you are also supposed not to 'do
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less'. You therefore try to be as generous, polite, courageous, proud, etc. as your nawle, ii
order to gain their respect. Sylla (1994) states that a Wolof behaves rightly, not for fear o
punishment, but for fear of committing a dishonourable act. In this way, the code o
honour, on the one hand, on a personal level induced a certain element of competitioi
among nawle, and therewith gave rise to certain mistrust amongst one another a's poten
tial rivais. On the other hand, on an institutional level, it produced social security; tb
feeling that social norms would prohibât excesses and would check players against thi
rules, provided people with a basic feeling of trust.
These last hundred years, however, the ongoing absorption of the local communir
into the wider economie and political system has deeply changed local society and ha
not left the social system unaffected. In borrowing a classification from Eisenstadt am
Roniger (1980), it can be stated that Wolof society from a (hierarchical) corporate kin
ship system developed into a more diffuse clientelistic system. While twenty-five year
ago, the old hierarchy was still an explicit realiry for the people in the communiry, defin
ing the major part of social relations (see Venema 1978), people now no longer refer to i
openly and deny its importance. It has to be emphasised, however, that in the back
ground it still appears to be present. Firstly, everybody knows exactly who belongs t<
which caste. Secondly, préjudices towards other castes do exist, as can be illustrated by.
young man (diambour, but his mother was dyarn), who told me that there are no difTer
ences between geer and nieenio, before adding that nieenio, however, never keep thei
word, unlike geer. Furthermore, in his opinion, the nieenio, the minstrels in particulai
are brought up too freely. Finally, relationships between families do not seem to hav
changed that much, as can be seen from the fact that the son of the village chief is still ac
companied by a descendant of the former slaves of the family, when hè goes to coliect th
taxes.
An important factor in this transformation has been the introduction of the peanu
as a cash erop at the end of the nineteenth Century. Traditionally, the local economy ha<
been based on the cultivation of subsistence crops, such as millet and sorghum. Durin;
the igth century, however, the French started to promote peanut cultivation in Senega
because they needed vegetable oil for their soap-industry. During the second half of th
igth century, the new cultivation practices caught on with the Senegalese farmers an<
quickly spread across the whole country. From the last decade of the century onwards
the farmers in the région of Keur Ousmane also started to cultivate peanuts, and fron
then on, were evermore incorporated into the world economy. In the beginning th
farmers often exchanged their peanuts for weapons, cloth, et cetera, but gradually cas!
payments took over. This transition was expedited by the obligation to pay taxes, intro
duced by the French after the conquest of Senegal (1887). Slowly, money also enterei
other sphères of the economy. Other French influences were the introduction of
French-style éducation system and administrative structure.
In 1960, Senegal's independence brought new changes. From then onwards until th
mid-eighties, the state became an important development agent in the area. Regional de
velopment organisations promoted and supported peanut and cereal cultivatio
(SODEVA) and the production of cotton (SODEFITEX). Village co-operatives distribute
seeds and fertiliser on profitable conditions and guaranteed the commercialisation of th
crops cultivated. As a conséquence of structural adjustment policy, however, in 1984
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New Agricultural Policy was launched, implyingarestructuring or liquidation of many
state development institutions. For the farmers, this meant that it became much more
difficult to obtain seed and fertilisers. Dévaluation in 1994 made things still worse, be-
cause thé price of inputs and basic consumption goods, such as rice, rosé significantly.
With thé retreat ofthe state, NGOs became more important. Some NGOs have been
working in thé rural community, intervening in varying degrees and in varying areas.
Other NGOs only offer infrastructure or working material, work with women groups or
deploy activities for handicapped youth, or work with entire villages, in which village
committees are created.
Environmental problems are manifold in thé area. The expansion of peanut cultiva-
tion from the fifties onwards coupled to a substantial population growth led to an exten-
sion ofthe agricultural area, whereby also marginal grounds not suitable for agriculture
were taken into use, and to the practical disappearance of fallow fields. The soils stripped
of their végétation are an easy victim to thé rains, which can be heavy and abundant. The
difficulties farmers have to obtain chemical fertilisers at a reasonable price thèse last years
as a resuit of national structural adjustment policy, strengthens their tendency to aug-
ment thé area under cultivation, just to obtain sufficient yield. Land pressure leads to a
compétition between différent uses: augmentation ofthe area under cultivation is often
at thé expense of herding routes, and conflicts arise when cattle holders find their way to
the water points barred, or when agriculturists see cattle entering their fields under culti-
vation. Finally, thé pressure on the land leads to a décline ofthe bush, which means that i t
becomes more difficult to obtain firewood, wood for construction and other forest prod-
ucts; also the game population has been strongly diminished. It is obvious that the situa-
tion of increasing pressure on thé local available natural resources, rapidly diminishing
in quantity as well as in quality, would benefit from consultation and co-operation
among thé growing number of users. This is required to collectively change things for thé
good and to safeguard thé local resource base for thé future. O therwise conflicts will esca-
late, and thé natural resources will be mined until thé point of no return.
Officially, thé rural council is thé forum to tackle these issues. In Senegal, rural coun-
cils hâve existed since 1974, when they were introduced in line with a national policy of
décentralisation. Thèse councils hâve to administer thé rural communities, and do hâve
extensive power in the management of natural resources. Legally, since 1964 all land is
state property, and it is the rural council which has the right to distribute land at the level
ofthe rural community, and to act as an arbiter in territorial conflicts. In practice, how-
ever, the council does not function properly. There are several reasons for this, but most
important are the lackoféducation ofthe councillors, the dualistic nature ofthe legal sys-
tem, and the persistency of clientelism.
The introduction ofthe rural council some thirty years ago had been rathersudden
and people were unprepared for it. The councillors elected were not very well informed
about their tasks and the laws they had to apply. What made it more difficult is that the
majori ty ofthe councillors could not (and still cannot) read or write. Secondly, the mod-
ern legal System has been laid down over the traditional System in which the lineages held
the land titles. Families who owned land before the reformation, continue to have a say
over their land, and thus for them the old rules continue to be valid. The new rules come
m when the land had not been tilled by them for a couple of years; in that case, the land
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falls (back) to the state. According to the modern law, it is the criterion of being capable
to till the land, which counts; what this practically means, however, is not exactly de-
fined, and leaves room for interprétation. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elabo-
rate on all of the conséquences of the co-existence and interférence of the two legal Sys-
tems. What is important in the framework of this argument, however, is that the
situation leads to possibilities for the rural council to choose those rules, which suit them
most. On the other hand, it leads to insecurity for people within the community. It is no
wonder then that most people take conflicts to the council only as a last resort, or when
they are sure that they can count on the support of the most prominent councillors.
Finally, the council has become an important institution of patronage. In the past pa-
tron-clientrelationships were institutionalised in caste-relationships. Nowadays, pa-
tron-clientrelationships have, however, become more diffuse with the intégration ofthe
local community in the broader framework ofthe state and the larger economy. Former
slaves can become rieh and thus a patron for less well-to-do diambour, political institu-
tions such as the rural council become the new focus points in trying to build fruitful
clientelistic relationships.
The arrivai of the project: statements of trust and feelings of mistrust
From the above, it is evident that economie stagnation, ecological dégradation and a
malfunctioning rural council are main problems in the area. This was also concluded by
an American NGO, which in the early nineties had started to develop a strategy to couple
economie growth at the local level to a sustainable management and use of natural re-
sources, in the same time strengthening local governmental capabilities. A project de-
sign was elaborated in which a territorial management plan was central. This plan had to
be made in co-operation with the population, and was meant to encompass a problem
analysis and action plan to improve the situation. A management committee, elected by
the people themselves, had to manage the financial means and to supervise all activities
executed in the framework ofthe project. Keur Ousmane was chosen as one ofthe first
rural communities to receive the project.
The project's first steps in the community were a couple of meetings to inform the
people about the activities, which would be undertaken, and to prépare them for the
élection ofthe management committee. During these meetings, impressive speeches in
which partnership, co-operation and the will to work were important components were
held by the project staff as well as by représentatives ofthe village population. When I
spoke to the people afterwards individually, however, many showed themselves to be
rather sceptical. I was a little surprised about this, because the project seemed really
promising and a large sum of money was involved, and this sceptical attitude was so
sharply in contrast with the words professed in public.2
One ofthe first things the project staff the villagers summoned to was to create GIEs
(Groupements d'Intérêt Economique, litt. Groups of Economie Interest) in order to be
el-i-gi-ble for financial support through the project. This in fact asked for a substantial
Investment on the part ofthe population: those who wanted to bid for a fund to establish
a GIE had to pay CFA 42,000' to obtain thé necessary documents for registration at the
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Chamber of Commerce. Having in mind thé négative reactions to the project I had
heard in thecourtyards, and thé always omniprésent lack ofliquidity in thé villages, Idid
notexpectmany peopleto respond to thiscall. Butagain, I was proven wrong: thepeople
responded massively. While it had been possible to form a GIE from 1984 onwards, until
thé arrivai of the project only one had been formed in Keur Ousmane, and it merely ex-
isted on paper. In January 1996, however, thirty had already been created. For example,
thé village of Keur Keba with a population of 1026 had twelve new GIEs at the end of Jan-
uary 1996, whereas thé village of Keur Samba (301 inhabitants) had four. In thé months
to follow this number increased further, but at a lower rate. When I asked thé people
about their motivation, they said that councillors had come to their village to tell them to
participate, so they had responded, but that they also confessed that they had serious
doubts.
The next step consisted of thé élection of the management committee, whose task it
would be to admimster the funds and to co-ordinate the project activities at the level of
thé rural community. The élection was a layered one: first, the members of the commit-
tee would be chosen, and from and by them the president of the committee. It had been
decided by the project that thé committee should be composed of représentatives of dif-
férent catégories of thé population. Thus, there would be a représentative of the crafts-
men, a représentative of thé cattle holders, a représentative of thé agriculturists, two rep-
résentatives of thé women groups, one représentative of the youth association, and three
représentatives of thé rural council. Each category had been informed beforehand and
had been summoned to set candidates; thé final élection took place during the meeting.
There were no problems, until theelection of the représentatives ofthe rural council.
What happened is that H., son ofthe imam and himself one ofthe councillors, put
himself, as well as those who he knew would support him, forward as a candidate. This
was apparently not what thé councillors had decided in advance. There was some confu-
sion among thé councillors, K. stood up but then immediately sät down again, without
protest. Finaily, they ail raised their hands as to show their approval ofthe candidates.
Now, being in thé committee, H. managed to play in such a way that in thé end, he was
chosen as président. This resuit caused some anxiery amongst thé population, for it was
public knowledge that H. had been involved in a project of sheep-breeding for some
years, from which he had appropriated a huge amount of money. Rumours ran around
thé courtyards and between thé walls ofthe houses; thé majority ofthe population, how-
ever, soon put up with thé situation because, they said, after all, the committee had been
chosen democratically.
The project staff took their time in preparing their activities and time passed with a
lot of meetings, but without the arrivai of funds. Thèse meetings were not well visited.
The major part ofthe population became ever more négative in thé course of time, sug-
gested that may be thé money had perhaps already been consumed in Dakar, and in thé
most positive case held on to an attitude of'seeing is believing'. It was the few intellect-
uals ofthe village, some youths who had attended school and the teachers ofthe primary
school, who seemed to keep faith and who attended thé meetings. Most distrustful was
an older woman who declared that she did not want to have anything to do with the pro-
ject. She said: 'When you come across a hole, but you are not sure whether the animal in 11
is dead or not, you don't put your hand in it, do you?'
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In talking to the people throughout these months, it became ever more clear to me
that in the past, they had already had many négative expériences, which in my view could
explain their lack of trust. For example, there was the aforementioned project for breed-
ing sheep. Many villagers had lent their work force to feed and get water for the sheep,
and in the weeks before the Islamic festival of Tabaski, the fattened cattle had been sold
for good priées. However, the people, who had worked so hard, never saw any ofthe
money; all had been taken by H. and his friends. This expérience and comparable stories
in which project, or in any case communal, money had simply disappeared, had made
people very distrustful of anything involving money. This distrust was not directed
against money as such, for example as discussed by Simmel (1978), but against people
with money, or money in the hands of particular men. This is linked to thé fear, and ex-
périence, that money can disappear fairly easily and uncontrollably, unlike a cow for ex-
ample. That is why many people prefer project-activities in which aid is given in kind
(cattle, trees, et cetera) and not in money.''
The feelings of distrust can be understood as a logical conséquence of these past expé-
riences. Yet why then, do thé people appear not to hâve learned from this, and why did
they choose the man who had betrayed them before? Or is it that they do not have any
choice, thereby making thé question whether they trust or mistrust absolutely irrele-
vant? This would be thé case if they were trapped in a highly vertical patron-client rela-
tionship in which there was no way out. I think, thisis hardlyeverso. In most cases, there
is some room for manoeuvre for thé patron as well as for his clients. This means that thé
patron and his clients hâve to make some effort to keep the relationship going; they have
to invest in trustworthiness. Clientelistic relations are not mechanical, in that thé patron
and thé client are tied to each other in an unavoidable way, creating a sort of'mechanical
solidarity'. To know more, we will have to unravel exactly how thé people are bound to
each other. Still, we are left with some other phenomena to be explained. Why was there
such a big gap between what thé people confessed in public and what they did and said
privately in their own quarters? Why did thé people so massively respond to thé call to
create GIEs? To answer thèse questions, we must return to the description ofthe Wolof
social System including its moral values, and its development over time. As Misztal
(1996:25) states:
Trust cannot be fully understood and studied without the examination of institu-
tions as repositories of a legacy of values and without addressing a practical issue of
how far human beings' concepts of duties and obligations are influenced by thé soci-
etal institutions which organize ways in which people are bound together.
Honour as a central concept in Wolof society and its conséquences for thé
working of trust
As has been stated in the fïrst section, Wolof horizontal social organisation based on kin-
ship was traditionallycrosscutby a vertical organisation based on caste and class. Intégra-
tion ofthe différent social layers was based on institutionalised patron-client relation-
ships between thé différent castes. Balancing mechanisms to forego too gréât an
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inequality and social distance herween the different social catégories were incorporated
into fixed codes of behaviour herween the castes. As has already been indicated, in thèse
codes honour was of central importance.
Kesteloot (1983), in analysing Wolof myths and taies, observes that they frequently
carry thé message that if people do not pursue honour, they will endanger peace. That is
to say that if one pursues honour, one will consequently pursue generosity, hospitality,
politeness, introspection, self-control and that there will therefore be peace. In this con-
text, Ly (1967) usefully distinguishes between honour as a susceptibility, a sentiment,
and honour as a moral principle2 This distinction makes it clear that thé code of honour
can rightly be considered as a hinge joint between thé individual and thé social: it is the
internalisation of social values and'm manifestation.
Honour as a moral principle is thé aspect of honour as treated in thé above: one
should behave in a honourable way in order to show oneself a worthy member of one's
family and one's social group, and in order not to endanger peace and solidarity. Honour
as a sentiment (dyom) is thé more personal aspect and can be translated by 'love of self,
self-respect, thé sentiment that one has its dignity. Ly states that thé Wolof do hâve a
strong feeling of self-respect; every act or fact that cornes to lack of respect is feit very
deeply. Honour as a sentiment cannot be seen apart from thé notion of shame (gatye); in
fact, gatyeis thé négative aspect oïdyom. It is no wonder that where honour is such an im-
portant value, shame is practically unbearable (and this goesas far as preferringsuicide to
living in shame) ; i t means that one has lost his honour befo re his nawle, and consequently
his place in society. This logic is also reflected in thé sanctions inflicted upon someone
who has not behaved honourably: he or she is subjected to différent degrees of isolation
and exclusion, depending on thé gravity of his or her misbehaviour. Trust can be seen as
connected with thé notionsofhonourandshame, consideringthe phrase 'tobetray one's
trust' (cf. Elster 1989:275). This means that in trusting more is at stake than simply thé
possibility that expectations will not be met; it means that onepersonallywiü be affected
and will be hurt (for an élaboration on thé relation trust-friendship see Silver 1989). One
will be put to shame and one's honour will be injured.
In taking thé argument further, I would like to state that like honour, trust has a
moral connotation in Wolof society. It is one's moral obligation to trust thé other, other-
wise thé latter may feel that his honour is being affected. In thé same way, it is one's duty
not to betray one's trust, because thé other will be hurt. Likewise, it also means that one
has to try not to hâve one's trust in others betrayed, in order to save face.
Of course, thé code of honour is strongly connected with thé hierarchical structure in
which it evolved. When thé social System changes, this will most probably have repercus-
sions for thé value System. This is confirmed by Ly, who states that in breaking down the
privileged position of thé old aristocracy, colonialism has sped up thé disparition of hon-
our as an aristocratie moral value. In addition, thé social character of honour has
changed, because thé family structure and thé rôle of the extended family has changed.
To this, I can add that thé modem éducation System and thé development of mass média
hâve lessened thé importance of thé old stratification. The idea that not only birth but
also personal achievement counts, gains importance, as does the consciousness of be-
longing to new catégories (intellectuals, politica! parties, certain professions) which did
not exist in the traditional order. Often, however, values change more slowly than
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socio-économie reality. Particularly thé feeling ofdyom, and tied to it, thé feeling ofj
continue to be strongly présent, being part of Wolof cultural and ethnical identity
these insights help us to understand our case?
A free ride,' chains of honour and a sensé of control
Focusingon thé man who was elected président of thé management committee, it il
dent that he has benefited from the ambiguous blending of the old value System am
possibilities offered by présent developments in society. As a son of the imam of l
Ousmane, he is covered by thé status of his family and thé esteem for its father, held b
cal society. As a politician of the biggest party at national level, he recognises himsi
member of a wider network on which he can fall back and from which he can profit.
The other villagers are in a much less advantageous situation. They see H. as a se
his father and as a member of his family, and in this quality, feel obliged to trust him;
could they not, his father being the highly esteemed imam of the grand mosque? Yet
traditional situation, it is very likely that they would haveenforced thé habituai sanci
on him for his dishonourable behaviour. Now, they do not dare, because thé m
backed by his position in a wider network. The people find thus themselves in a hi
ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the morality of honour and trust together \
of course, the hope to gain something, compel thé people to involve; on thé othei
anxiety of preserving one's honour, evolving from thé same moral of honour, coupli
a feeling of mistrust, compels them to be very careful and perhaps not to get invc
themselves. Thèse contradictory motivations lead to ambivalent behaviour: they ac
they trust the man and state this in public—because they feel obliged to, and because
do not want to miss a chance, hoping to gain something and while missing a ch
would be shameful. In fact, however, they do not trust, which makes them hésitai
co-operate with the project. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that they want to
guard themselves against the risk of losing face if their trust stated in public will bi
trayed. So, they avow that they hâve their sévère doubts against thé whole undertakir
Clearly, there are some people, which do not fit this picture. For example, the c
woman who did not mince her words and the teachers who seemed to participate il
project more wholeheartedly than thé other villagers. It seems that there are categori
local society who do not need to safeguard their honour, because they are already a
lowest position, such as elderly women or very poor families. They can afford to let ù
selves be guided by their trust or mistrust; in this case, they drop out. For thé teache
seems that while they also are not in thé position to control H. on basis of the old cod
honour, they still have a feeling of being able to exert some control. They can read
write, are able to understand thé project's working strategy and to check the proced
This makes them more confident and disposed to participate.
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Conclusions
In the above, I have tried to explain the ambiguous way in which the people of Keur
Ousmane responded to a new project arriving in thé area. On the one hand, they stated
their trust in words, in answering thé request to form GIEs, and in choosing H. as presi-
dent of the management commi ttee. On thé other, they displayed mistrust in the project
by their marginal participation and their négative statements in private. It was found
that while socio-économie circumstances have strongly changed throughout the past
few decades, the viliagers still acted to a large degree upon the old value-system based on
the code of honour. This made them show their willingness to participate in the project,
but on the other hand also made them careful and hésitant to participate. Besides, there
was a growing genera! mistrust among the population, which had been nourished by
négative expériences with projects and collective activities in the past. Since these nega-
tive expériences had been concerned with betrayal of trust by people who had been con-
sidered trustworthy, it was no wonder that the arrivai of the project led to confusion and
activated mistrust among the population because they were asked to invest their trust
again. For the moment, they tried to solve the problem by acting as usual, that is in using
the code of honour as their guide. It may be concluded that the non-fitting of old values
and new social realities on the one hand strengthened confusion and distrust among the
majority of the viliagers. On the other, it created possibilities for personal gain for a mi-
nority, such as H.
The first question concerned thé relationship between trust and co-operation. On
the one hand, we saw that trust and mistrust played a rôle in thé viliagers' décision to en-
gage in the project, but that they did not guide décisions in thé first place. Rather, it was
the préservation of one's own and other people's honour, which motivated people's be-
haviour to a large extent. On thé other hand, a minimum of trust seemed to be required
to make people décide to participate in the project. It appears that co-operation among
viliagers or participation of viliagers in a project may continue in a situation of growing
distrust, when other incentives play a rôle such as personal interest or the guidance of
norms. However, this is only up till a certain point; after this point, people will drop out.
In this context, trust in thé first sight may be characterised as a prerequisite for
co-operation. After this stage, trust is merely a 'social lubricant', which may 'smooth', or
facilitate co-operation, but which need not be a direct drive for people to engage in
co-operation.
Let us consider thé second question. Historically speaking, trust evolved as a
by-product of a social order in which social norms were important to balance and control
societal relations. Social codes of honour, however, more often fail to fulfil this balancing
function. In this situation, thé chances for potential free riders increased. Since there are
apparently fellow viliagers who do no longer feel obliged to behave according to thé
rules, confusion and mistrust growamong thé population. Onecouldsay that thé viliag-
ers increasingly feel that they control neither thé other viliagers nor the situation; tradi-
tional mechanisms of control are no longer effective, and most people feel they hâve no
tools to handle the new situation. For the time being, they tend to stick to the old ones.
The more this feeling of being out of control grows, however, thé more distrust rises and
the more the viliagers tend to act accordingly, that is to withdraw from co-operation and
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participation in collective activities. This is best illustrated by thé older woman who doe
not want to have anything to do with the project and the intellectuals who seem D
co-operate most wholeheartedly of all the viliagers. The old woman practically has m
means to influence at all. In contrast, the teachers feel (partially) in control, because the
can read and write and thus are able to check the procedures and the like.
Especially persons who are brokers between local society and the 'outside world' rui
the risk of becoming distrusted by their fellow-villagers. There are several reasons fo
this: firstly, because they are in touch with rules and norms valuable to the outside world
it is likely that they have internalised part of it, and tend not to behave according to loca
norms only. Secondly, as is illustrated by the local politician H., brokers have mos
chances to piay the free rider rôle, because they can move more freely than their fel
low-villagers, not feeling as totally dependent on the moral judgement of their loca
Community as the others. Thus, the distrust local people develop will very likely to a larg
extent concern people in a broker position. It is highly probable that this distrust extend
beyond these brokers. Through them, the distrust of the viliagers also begins to affec
those parts of the wider society with which these persons are linked, for example the na
tional political System, a development organisation, or the state. In that case, the trus
that traditionally had been vested in people via locally based institutions, is transformée
into distrust with potentially sévère knock-on effects on external institutions.
From the point of view of co-operation, this is a dangerous development. Firstly, be
cause mutual distrust among the viliagers indeed hampers co-operation, as can be seer
from the fact that these last years participation in local collective activities has been de
creased, people preferring to work on their own or with some close friends or relative
only. Secondly, because the distrust in institutions, which may develop as a conse
quence, is likely to be more persistent and more diffïcult to fight; for while it is built uj
indirectly, it can only be broken down indirectly. From there on, the conditions fo
co-operation will continue to get worse.
We may compare the above observations concerning the changes in trust relations ii
the local Community of Keur Ousmane with the observations from Luhmann am
Giddens concerning the development of trust in conditions of modernity. What is strik
ing in Giddens' analysis is his assumption that the représentatives of the expert system
are trusted as représentatives ofthat system in the first place, not as persons; confideno
in the system brings people to trust its représentatives. In the Community described
however, it seems as if the traditional organisation of trust, which one could label a 'per
sonalised system trust', is extended towards modern abstract Systems. Because for trust
ing abstract Systems, it is personal trust that prevails: représentatives of those system
seem not to be seen as continuations of the system, rather the system is seen as a continua
tion of the person involved. This can be illustrated by local people's attitude toward
money as mentioned in section two. The viliagers reveal themselves to be distrustfu
against money and avoid workingwith it, because they do not trust people with money
So, for the judgement of the value of money, money in the hands of man is more impor
tant than the quality of the money or the money-system as such. It may be interesting t<
further investigate how in this local context 're-embedding' of abstract Systems take
place, but it goes too far to elaborate on it hère.
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For thé moment, we may conclude that thé trust présent in thé local community of
Keur Ousmane is mainly personal trust, because confidence in thé old System of local
rules and norms is in steady décline, while trust in modem institutions mainly runs via
persons. Trust in persons is less stable than trust in Systems, while established or broken
down as a direct conséquence of thé other's behaviour. This means that, in thé situation
described, the basis for co-operation is also less stable than in situations where sys-
tem-based trust is more strongly developed. People may engage easily in co-operation
when there is interpersonal trust, but they also may drop ont easily, when there is no or
veryiittlesystem-based trust. This suggests that personal andsystem-based trust areboth
important for co-operation, but that they in this respect hâve a différent function.
Which form is the most needed dépends on thé form of co-operation desired, whether
this is incidental or long-term, between few or many people et cetera. In général, how-
ever, thé effectivenessof trust for co-operation ultimately dépends on theircombined ef-
fect, that is when personal trust is backed by System trust and vice versa.
What finally remains is our third question as posed in thé introduction: how trust
may eventually be enhanced in order to increase the po tentiality for co-operation? It may
be evident at thé end of this exposition that this question remains a difficult one to an-
swer. The above discussion clearly demonstrates that trust is indeed an elusive concept,
and that its relation to co-operation is difficult to grasp. Firstly, trust plays a rôle in peo-
ple's behaviour, but rarely constitutes thé main driving force to engage in co-operation.
Secondly, trust evolves as a by-product of other social processes and mechanisms, which
also makes i t difficult to be régula ted. Thirdly, thé spécifie linking of personal and System
trust seems to hâve an impact on thé spécifie possibilities of and restraints to
co-operation in a given case.
We have also seen, however, that trust is important for co-operation, and as such, de-
velopment agents such as the state or a NGO may wish to embark upon strengthening
trust in localities such as thé one described. Let us therefore try to find some start-
ing-points for action. The observation that mistrustgrew because old controllmg mech-
anisms no longer did, points to thé importance ofcontrol in thé évolution of trust. While
trust is often treated as qualitatively différent from control, whereby trust and con trol are
seen as two parallel tracks which do not meet, I would argue with Luhmann that (thé feel-
ing of) having some degree ofcontrol over others or over the situation is a prerequisite for
trust. This means that if one wants to foster trust in order to facilitate co-operation in sit-
uations where old controlling mechanisms no longer do, it may be advisable to also focus
on the fostering of new controlling mechanisms. In the case of Keur Ousmane, thé liter-
acy of thé villagers for example, could make them feel more in control of modem institu-
tions, such as thé rural council or thé development project, because they would be better
able to check procédures and proceedings. While they can check, they may feel that they
can develop confidence in thèse institutions. Good-working, well-checked, institutions
will leave less room for potential free-riders and, as a conséquence, people may begin to
trust each other again.
